There are large di¤erences in performance across …rms, even in the same industry and region. This paper examines one explanation for these di¤erences -individual entrepreneurs. We use deaths of more than 300 entrepreneurs as a source of exogenous variation, and ask whether this variation can explain shifts in …rm performance. We …nd large and robust e¤ects of entrepreneurs on job creation, growth, and pro…tability at all levels of the …rm performance distribution. The results suggest that the e¤ects of entrepreneurs are stronger early in the …rm's life and stronger for founders with high human capital. We do not …nd di¤erences between family and non-family …rms, nor do we …nd di¤erences between …rms located in urban and rural areas. Overall, the results suggest that an often overlooked factor -individual entrepreneurs -play a large role in shaping the performance of …rms.
I. Introduction
In the large literature on …rm performance, economists have given little attention to the role of individual entrepreneurs. While the idea of entrepreneurs as movers and shakers is For valuable input thanks to many seminar audiences and to John Moore, Tom Hubbard, and Steve Tadelis. The results of a pilot study were circulated under the title "Are founders non-substitutable? Evidence from start-ups where founders die".
y Becker: CAGE @ Warwick University, CEPR, CESifo, Ifo and IZA. Email: s.o.becker@warwick.ac.uk. Hvide: University of Bergen, CEPR and University of Aberdeen. Email: hans.hvide@econ.uib.no. old (e.g., Schumpeter, 1934) , it is geographical, institutional, and industry characteristics that have received most attention from empirical work. 1 It is hard to imagine the success of Apple Computers without Steve Jobs, or Ford Motor Corporation without Henry Ford. It is unknown, however, whether these exceptional individuals were exactly that -exceptional -or whether entrepreneurs more generally have much of an e¤ect.
2 Systematic evidence …nds considerable heterogeneity in the performance of …rms within the same industry, region and age groups (Foster et al, 2008) .
One objective of the paper is to ask whether individual entrepreneurs, as opposed to geographical and industry characteristics, can in part account for the unexplained di¤erences.
This paper asks whether individual entrepreneurs have a causal e¤ect on …rm performance. In addition to informing our understanding of …rm growth, survival and profitability, this question relates to an old debate stemming from Coase (1937) over what constitutes a …rm and what keeps …rms together. For example, the property rights view of the …rm (e.g., Grossman & Hart, 1986 , Hart, 1995 emphasizes non-human assets, while Hart & Moore (1994) and Zingales (2000) emphasize human assets. We focus on the role of the entrepreneur, and whether entrepreneurs provide the "glue" that keeps the …rm together.
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To examine the in ‡uence of entrepreneurs on …rm performance, one can investigate 1 See, for example, Djankov et al. (2002) and Klapper et al. (2006) on entry regulation, Djankov (2009) on tax regime, Glaeser et al. (1992) on local competition and urban variety, Glaeser (2007) on industry structure, Lerner & Malmendier (2011) on peer e¤ects, and Rajan & Zingales (1998 on …nancing environment.
2 Johnson et al. (1985) examine the e¤ect on share price of senior management deaths for a sample of 53 U.S. publicly traded …rms. While the e¤ect of CEO death is negative for the sample overall, they …nd a positive e¤ect for CEOs that also were founders of the company, a …nding veri…ed with more recent data by Perez-Gonzales (2006) . As shown by Slovin and Sushka (1993) , some of these results might be explained not by entrepreneur ability but by changes in the probability of a corporate control contest, in that founder deaths might trigger …rm sales that would not occur under alternative organizational structures.
3 Kaplan et al. (2009) study strategy and management changes in a sample of 156 fast-growing companies that eventually go public. Between being venture capital …nanced and the initial public o¤ering, almost none of these companies change their line of business, while the management team change quite frequently. Thus for this sample of companies, the idea seemed more stable than the management team. Since all the companies in Kaplan et al. (2009) were very successful, it is hard to evaluate the importance of human versus other factors. Baron and Hannan (2002) review studies of a panel of young …rms from California. The studies show that initial models of employment tend to persist, and when the employment models are changed, employee turnover increases and performance declines. The studies do not focus on the role of the founder.
whether the entrepreneur's engagement (as measured by e.g., his employment relationship with the …rm or whether he is a sole owner) is associated with …rm performance. This strategy is problematic, of course, as engagement is likely to be in ‡uenced by underlying economic conditions. To deal with this problem, we examine …rms where the entrepreneur dies. In these …rms, the entrepreneur's engagement was random, determined by the timing of the entrepreneur's death rather than underlying economic conditions. These deaths therefore provide an opportunity to quantify whether entrepreneurs have a causal e¤ect on …rm performance. 4 We construct a database that contains longitudinal information on the universe of incorporated …rms started up in Norway between 1999 and 2007. The data, which includes yearly accounting and employment measures, allows us to identify entrepreneurs through initial ownership shares (we de…ne an entrepreneur as an individual that has more than 50 percent ownership stake at the incorporation date). It also includes panel information about each founder, such as education and work history, in addition to year of death, if applicable. We track …rm performance until the end of 2010, so that …rms in our database are between zero and twelve years old. There is no survivorship bias in the data as we follow each …rm from the …rst year onwards.
We identify 341 …rms where the entrepreneur dies before the end of 2009. For each of these …rms we use propensity score matching to identify a "twin" …rm (which we restrict to be started up in the same calendar year). These twins have similar characteristics at startup date, but do not experience subsequent entrepreneur death. Relative to this "control group", we …nd robust evidence that …rm performance patterns drop in a sustained fashion after the entrepreneur's death. The magnitudes of the e¤ects are large; for example the mean employment e¤ects are about 17 percent, while the mean e¤ects on sales is about 60 percent.
Most of the e¤ects work via lower survival rates; …rms experiencing entrepreneur death have about 20 percentage point lower survival rates two years after the death event.
4 Several recent papers use death as an exogenous event to study causal e¤ects, for example Azoulay et al. (2010) on the spillover e¤ects of research superstars, Jones (2005) on the in ‡uence of national leaders for economic growth, Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) on the value of independent directors at company boards, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) and Andersen and Nielsen (2012) on the e¤ect of windfall gains through inheritance on entrepreneurial activity. The literature using death as a source of exogenous variation starts with Johnson et al. (1985) and is surveyed by Nguyen & Nielsen (2010) .
Entrepreneur death speeds up evolution by weeding out weak …rms, but this is not the whole story. Using quantile regressions, we …nd strong negative e¤ects of founder death in all deciles of the …rm performance distribution. We infer that entrepreneurs have an important causal e¤ect at all levels in the …rm performance distribution.
One explanation for our results is that entrepreneur death creates turbulence. If turbulence lies behind our results, we would expect entrepreneur death to have a large immediate e¤ect on …rm performance, and a partial or full reversal over time. In fact, our point estimates suggest that the immediate e¤ects of entrepreneur death are quite modest relative to the e¤ects that accumulate after some time.
We then examine whether the importance of entrepreneurs varies with …rm age. In order to examine this question we analyze whether the drop in …rm performance depends on …rm age when the entrepreneur dies. The …rm being older means that the entrepreneur has had more time to make an imprint. This led us to believe that the importance of the entrepreneur would increase over time. We …nd, however, that the importance of the entrepreneur diminishes with …rm age but does not seem to vanish even when …rm age is close to ten years. We …nd this an important result as most …rms do not even survive until they are ten years old.
We also examine what type of entrepreneur matters more or less, and in what type of …rms. Motivated by a surge of interest in family …rms, we examine the performance of family …rms. We do not …nd that family …rms are more or less resilient to the loss of the founder. Based on the endogenous growth literature (e.g., Glaeser et al., 1992) , we ask whether the causal e¤ect of individual entrepreneurs is lesser in urban areas, where the supply of entrepreneurs is likely to be denser. We …nd however, no di¤erence in causal e¤ect of entrepreneurs in rural and urban areas. 5 We …nd some evidence suggesting that high human capital founders are more important, and that founders are more important in …rms in high human capital industries.
Another concern is that many …rms in our sample could be tax-reduction vehicles, or …rms started up as a "consumption good" or leisure activity for the entrepreneur. 6 In 5 An interesting question is whether the causal e¤ect of entrepreneurs is smaller in urban areas with a higher entrepreneurship rate. We turn to this issue below. 6 For example, Hamilton (2001) …nds low cross-sectional returns (relative to wage work) in a sample of self-employed individuals and interprets this …nding as a main role of self-employment being to provide neither case would it be surprising to see the …rm vanish with the founder. We therefore investigated whether the e¤ect of entrepreneur death depends on startup size, the idea being that small startups are more likely to have founders with these types of motivations.
We …nd large e¤ects for startups both below and above median size in terms of initial equity. 7 We then split …rms up depending on whether they had two or more employees at the end of the …rst year or not. We …nd only minor di¤erences in the e¤ect of entrepreneur death for these types of …rms.
An even simpler explanation for our …ndings could be reverse causality: entrepreneurs have a higher chance of dying if their …rms perform poorly. To deal with the possibility of reverse causality, we use propensity score matching on pre-determined founder and …rm characteristics. Using formal tests, we do not …nd evidence of pre-treatment e¤ects. This suggests that reverse causality is not a big concern.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses existing literature and debates about the role of entrepreneurs and the theory of the …rm. Section III presents the empirical methodology and data used in the paper. Section IV presents the main results of the impact of entrepreneurs on …rm performance, and examines how entrepreneur, …rm, and industry-level characteristics a¤ect the degree. Section V examines how the in ‡uence of entrepreneurs varies with …rm age. Section VI interprets the results and concludes.
II. Why should individual entrepreneurs matter?
Many empirical studies of …rm performance implicitly assume a neoclassical view of the …rm in which entrepreneurs are homogeneous inputs into the production process. Under this quite narrow view, di¤erent entrepreneurs are regarded as perfect substitutes for one another. A version of this view is the model of Kihlstrom & La¤ont (1979) , where the entrepreneur bears residual risk but does not contribute to …rm performance. In sortbene…ts such as a more ‡exible work hours or a sense of control. See also Moskovitz & Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) . 7 The estimated results are weak for the largest 10-15 percent of the …rms in our sample. This subsample is not large enough to have reasonable standard errors. If we con…ne attention to the largest 25 percent of …rms in our sample, the estimated e¤ects are large.
ing models (e.g., Lucas, 1979 , Evans & Jovanovic, 1989 , Lazear, 2005 , individuals are endowed with di¤erent entrepreneurial ability. In the equilibrium of these models, individuals with high entrepreneurial ability become entrepreneurs, while individuals with low entrepreneurial ability become workers. Although this type of theory is not inconsistent with individual entrepreneurs being important to …rm performance, a degree of smoothness in the distribution of entrepreneurial ability will tend to rule out individuals playing a large role. 8 One theory in support of the entrepreneur being important for nascent …rms is critical resource theory (Wernerfelt, 1984 , and Rajan and Zingales, 1998 , 2001 , where a …rm is a set of speci…c investments built around a critical resource or resources. In the current context it is useful to think of the entrepreneur's own human capital and ideas as the critical resource. This theoretical tradition opens up for the entrepreneur having a particularly bene…cial match with the …rm he starts up because he can design a …rm in order to maximize the value of his human capital (this is a sense in which the entrepreneur creates a new production function), by for example de…ning a product line or investing in human or physical assets that are complementary to his human capital. If the founder disappears this has two potentially important e¤ect on …rm productivity. The …rst is that the critical resource is gone. The second is that the remaining physical and human resources become less productive. We …nd very large e¤ects on …rm assets after founder death. This is consistent with the view that physical assets are allocated to more productive use elsewhere in the economy after the critical resource dies. 8 Recent theories of entrepreneurship such as Hellmann (2007) and Hvide (2009) emphasize contractual frictions in established …rms. These contractual frictions induce individuals with promising ideas to leave and start up their own …rms. Although these theories can explain why some individuals wish to become entrepreneurs, they cannot explain why these individuals become non-substitutable in the new …rms.
III. Data and empirical methodology III.A. Data
We construct a database that consists of the universe of …rms incorporated in Norway between 1999 and 2007, where one individual holds more than 50%. 9 The data includes yearly accounting and employment measures for each …rm until the end of 2010, so that the …rms in our database are between zero and twelve years old. The data also contain ownership shares in the incorporation year broken down by individual, and a detailed panel on sociodemographic information on all owners with at least 10 percent ownership share, including year of death if applicable.
We start out with a brief description of the Norwegian economy and the basis for the data collection (for a comparison with Sweden, see Calvet et al., 2007) . 10 Norway is an industrialized nation with a population of about 4.7 million. The GDP per capita in 2008 was about $58,717 when currencies are converted at purchasing power parity; this is higher than the EU average of $30,651. Norway is characterized by a large middle class, and a lower inequality in disposable income than most other industrialized nations. Norwegian households are subject to both a capital income tax and a wealth tax every year throughout their lives. 11 Because of the existence of the wealth tax, the government's statistical agency, Statistics Norway (also known by its Norwegian acronym SSB) collects yearly data on wealth and income at the individual level from a variety of sources, including the Norwegian Tax Agency, welfare agencies, and the private sector. Financial institutions supply information to the tax agency on their customers'deposits, interest paid or received, security investments, and dividends. Employers similarly supply statements of wages paid to their employees. The data is compiled from three di¤erent registers:
9 The Norwegian dividend tax reform of 2006 had the implication that a large number of …rms started up in NACE …ve-digit sector no. 65238 (portfolio investments) in 2006 were tax minimization vehicles (in fact, most of these …rms were closed down in 2007). We therefore eliminated these …rms from our database. We also eliminated …rms where the founder died in 2010 because there is no post-death information for them. We also drop …rms where the founder was older than 67, i.e. beyond retirement age, when founding the …rm. Our results do not weaken if we include these …rms. 10 The following …gures are taken from the OECD Statistical Pro…le for Norway: 2010, available at OECD.org 11 In contrast, the U.S. tax system requires wealth reporting only in connection with estate tax, which is imposed only on the very rich at the time of death (Campbell, 2006 3. Founding documents submitted by new …rms to the government agency 'Brønnøy-sundregisteret'. These register data include the start-up year, total capitalization, and the personal identi…cation number and ownership share of all founders with at least 10 percent ownership stake.
For each new …rm identi…ed in 1), we compile a list of founders identi…ed through 3) and match their associated sociodemographic information from 2). We de…ne an entrepreneur as a person with more than 50 percent ownership of the total shares in a newly established incorporated company. Restricting the sample to majority owners ensures that we are likely to include "real" entrepreneurs in our sample. For some …rms, the …rst year of …nancial reporting, de…ned through 1), is later than the year of incorporation de…ned by 3). For these …rms, we de…ne the …rst year as the …rst year of reporting.
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12 Earnings and wealth …gures are public information in Norway. This transparency is generally believed to make tax evasion more di¢ cult and hence our data more reliable. 13 The vast majority of …rms start operation (and submit …nancial reports) within their …rst or second year after incorporation.
Similar to other industrialized countries, setting up an incorporated company in Norway carries tax bene…ts relative to being self-employed (e.g., more bene…cial write-o¤s for expenses such as home o¢ ce, company car, and computer equipment), and incorporation status will therefore be more tax e¢ cient than self-employment status except for the smallest projects. The formal capital requirement for registering an incorporated company was NOK 50,000 in equity until 1998 and NOK 100,000 thereafter. NOK 50,000 is equivalent to about 6,500 Euro.
We can note several advantages of our data compared to earlier datasets on entrepreneurship, in particular work on the self-employed. First, since we study incorporations, we can meaningfully distinguish between the life-span of the founder and the life-span of the …rm. The empirical strategy of the current paper would be impossible with data on the self-employed. Second, in contrast to the Surveys of Small Business Finances, we have access to a long panel with yearly and multiple measures of entrepreneurial performance.
This enables us to perform a longitudinal analysis and a variety of robustness tests.
Moreover, incorporated companies are required to have an external auditor certifying the accounting statements in the annual reports. Third, we have detailed data on the wealth and wage history of the founders. This enables us to control for founder human capital and liquidity much more comprehensively than in previous datasets. Fourth, we have access to the industry codes of the start-ups, so that we can control for industry-speci…c e¤ects. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the …rms and founders in the sample. Founder characteristics generally refer to the …rst year of operations, with the exception of log wealth and log earnings which are taken as …ve-year averages prior to …rm foundation, not including the startup year.
III.B. Descriptives of original sample
Firm characteristics refer to time of incorporation. Table 1 directly contrast characteristics treated founders (i.e. founders who die during our sample period) with control founders (those who don't die). In the initial sample of 37,011 founders who are majorityowners, 341 die during our sampling period. Founders who die are older and (likely as a consequence thereof) wealthier and less educated. The sectoral composition is very similar. The only small di¤erences are that …rms where the founder dies are more likely to be in real estate and transport, but less likely in business services and …nancial intermediation. This might re ‡ect the fact that the treated founders are more less educated and therefore more prone to be in more "traditional"industries. Table 2 shows the timing of entry and the timing of death for the "treated"founders in our sample. Firms where the founder dies enter over all years between 1999 and 2007.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Founders of these …rms die in any of the years 2000 through 2009.
14 Another interesting descriptive is …rm age at founder death. Again, founder death occurs at any …rm age, from year 1 through year 10 (the maximum …rm age possible given our sample). In our analysis, amongst others, we will look into the question whether founder death has di¤erent implications for younger versus older …rms.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
III.C. Empirical strategy
It is natural not to compare the 341 founders who die to all 37,011 founders who do not die, but to limit the analysis to those founders/…rms in the control group who are most comparable in terms of their observable characteristics. We use propensity score matching to select the founders in the control group who are most similar to the founders who die.
More speci…cally, we use nearest neighbor matching to select those founders in the control group whose ex ante probability of dying is closest to that of the 341 founders who die.
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Our further analysis then proceeds on this matched sample.
The propensity score is the probability of treatment (i.e. founder death) conditional on pre-treatment characteristics. The idea of propensity score matching is to match treated and controls whose ex ante probability of receiving treatment (i.e. to die during the …rst years after …rm foundation) -as predicted by their pre-treatment characteristics -is 'identical'(see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . By pre-treatment characteristics we mean 14 Remember that we deliberately excluded observations where the founder dies in 2010 because we have no data for their …rms after the year of death, so we cannot identify e¤ects of founder death on …rm survival and …rm performance for them. 15 Alternatively, we used two-nearest neighbor matching with very similar results. characteristics at …rm foundation, i.e. the variables shown in Table 1 . Characteristics measured at a later point, e.g. in the year before founder death, might already be subject to endogeneity bias because of the foreshadows of (later) founder death. For the control group, the year before founder death it is not even well-de…ned.
To estimate the propensity score, we run a probit model of founder death on the characteristics from Table 1 . The results are reported in Appendix activities. This is to make sure that we are comparing pairs of treated and control …rms that started life together and are of same age in all of their years of operation.
In line with the di¤erences detected in Table 1 between treatment and control group, we …nd the pre-treatment characteristics to have substantial explanatory power in predicting founder death. Table A .1 shows that the pseudo-R 2 is .11 and that the variables entering the propensity score are jointly signi…cant at the 1%-level. Another indicator of di¤erences between treatment and control group before matching is the so-called median absolute standardized bias which is de…ned by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) as the comparison between (standardized) means of treated and control units, where the standardized di¤erences (standardized biases) between the means for a covariate x i are de…ned as:
16 Some control units are automatically dropped in the propensity score estimation because they have predicted probabilities of zero, i.e. their characteristics perfectly predict non-treatement. 17 We use a version of Edwin Leuven and Barbara Sianesi's Stata module psmatch2 (2010, version 4.0.4, http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html ) to perform propensity-score matching and covariate balance testing. 18 We also looked at results without imposing a caliper and results are very similar, so imposing the caliper is not essential in our case, but follows common practice. where x i1 denotes the treated unit mean and x i0 the control unit mean for covariate x i .
The median absolute standardized bias before matching is 18.04. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest that a value of 20 is "large", i.e. in line with the other two indicators above, treated and control groups do di¤er considerably ex ante. Appendix Table A.2 shows the absolute standardized bias before matching for each individual covariate.
On the basis of the estimated propensity score, for each treated we search for the control whose propensity score is closest to that of the treated, so-called nearest neighbor matching. All control units that do not qualify as a nearest neighbor, are discarded from the further analysis.
Matching is giving us a better control group and reduces the bias in comparing treated and control groups to the extent that it manages to largely remove the pre-treatment di¤erences between treatment and control group.
We can formally test this, using the same three indicators of imbalance between treatment and control group, but now on the matched sample. To do so, we re-run the same propensity score speci…cation on the matched sample, i.e. on the sample of treated and matched controls. After matching, the pseudo-R 2 drops to .02. Similarly, the variables entering the propensity score are now no longer jointly signi…cant, with a p-value of .957.
The median absolute median absolute standardized bias drops from 18.04 before matching to 2.90 after matching. 19 Matching thus seems to be very successful in removing di¤er-ences in observable pre-treatment characteristics. In other words, our matched sample consists of …rms where the founder dies and a set of 'twin …rms'who are ex ante observationally identical, but where the founder does not die. We consider the matched control group as a suitable comparison group that approximates the counterfactual outcome of the treated …rms. 19 The median absolute median absolute standardized bias after matching is de…ned as
where i1M and i0M refer to the matched treated and control units.
IV. Do entrepreneurs matter? Evidence

IV.A. Regression equation
We ask whether individual entrepreneurs have a causal e¤ect on …rm performance. To answer this question, we want to understand whether …rms where the founder dies, perform di¤erently from …rms where the founder does not die. We are mainly interested in di¤erences after founder death. However, we also look into performance di¤erences before founder death. Di¤erences in performance before founder death would be indicative of a deterioration of conditions of the founder and his …rm already before his death. As we will show, there are no di¤erences between treated and control …rms before founder death, which is consistent with two possible explanations: either founder death comes indeed as a surprise, in which case it is natural not to detect any pre-death di¤erences in performance.
Alternatively, even if there are health issues of the founder already before his year of death, they do not seem to a¤ect …rm performance. In fact, when comparing …rm performance measures in the year before founder death, we can again use the median absolute median absolute standardized bias and the pseudo-R2 of a regression of the treatment dummy on …rm performance measures 20 as indicators of di¤erences between treated and control …rms. We …nd the median absolute standardized bias to be 2.06, so very small. Similarly, the pseudo-R2 from a regression of the treatment dummy on these performance measures 0.005, an indication that treated and controls do not di¤er at all in their performance in the year before founder death. In fact, when looking at t-tests for di¤erences in means between treated and matched controls for each and every performance variable, we …nd no single signi…cant di¤erences in the year before founder death. All t-statistics are below 1. We take this as clear evidence that treated and control founders/…rms are not only comparable at …rm foundation (see the results from propensity score estimation discussed earlier on), but that matched pairs of treated and controls founded in the same year also develop similarly until the year right before founder death.
Our main focus from now on is on understanding whether founder death a¤ects …rm performance after founder death. Why do we not do standard regression analysis using 20 We use the same …rm performance measures that we later use in our main analysis: (log) assets, log(number of employees), pro…ts, return on assets and (log) sales. the whole sample? There are two reasons for this. First, as shown above, treated and controls are not necessarily comparable ex ante. Angrist (1998) shows that matching and regression analysis using a fully saturated model, i.e. using a fully interacted model, di¤er only in the (implicit) weighting attached to treatment e¤ects within cells de…ned by combinations of X characteristics. So matching is not fundamentally di¤erent from a fully saturated OLS model. Second, and most importantly, for control observations, the year of founder death is not even de…ned. Matching is key to …nding comparable controls who started business in the same year as individual treated observations. We then take the year of founder death of treated observations to impute the counterfactual year of founder death of the matched control.
21 Based on this, we can de…ne "before"and "after"founder death for both treated and matched controls. Our estimation sample consists of the 339 treated and 339 matched controls.
We start by looking at very basic di¤erences-in-di¤erences panel regressions of the following type, where we compare treated and controls and how …rm performance is a¤ected by founder death:
P erf ormance = + 1 treated + 2 af ter treated + 3 af ter + X +
2 is our main coe¢ cient of interest, measuring the di¤erence between treated and control …rms after founder death. But also 1 is of interest because it provides for a test of (a lack of) pre-treatment e¤ects.
We routinely control for all variables that entered the original matching procedure, i.e. founder and …rm characeristics pertaining to the year in which the …rm started operations. This is to is to adjust for any small residual bias and to increase e¢ ciency. This "bias-corrected"matching has been found in Abadie and Imbens (2006) to work well in practice.
Later, we extend this analysis in various ways. First, we look in more detail at how performance varies year by year after founder death, i.e. we replace simple "after" dummies by indicators for "one year after founder death", "two years after founder death"etc. 21 In fact the analysis described above, where we looked into the comparison of treated and controls in the year before founder death is based on the actual (for the treated) and imputed (for the controls) year of founder death.
Second, we look into heterogeneity of the treatment e¤ect by founder and …rm characteristics. The idea is that, for instance, the death of a highly educated founder, is a bigger loss to the …rm than the death of a less educated founder. Similarly, founder death may be more detrimental for young …rms than for mature …rms. Third, we look into quantile regressions to see whether results are driven by things happen at the lower, middle or upper end of the performance distribution. We turn to these issues below.
Startup performance can be re ‡ected in growth, survival, and pro…tability. We analyze how entrepreneur death a¤ects all these aspects of …rm performance. To assess growth, we examine the e¤ect of entrepreneur death on sales, on human assets as measured by employment, and on the (book) value of physical assets. For …rms that close down, we set the relevant variables equal to zero to measure the e¤ect on employment, assets etc. 22 To assess pro…tability, we use two measures. The second is an adjusted version of operating return on assets (OROA). OROA is de…ned as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to the total asset base used to generate them, and is the standard performance measure in a large accounting and …nancial economics literature (see, e.g., Bennedsen et al. 2007 and references therein). 23 Firms that cease to exist have zero earnings and zero assets, and OROA is unde…ned. We impute OROA equal to zero for …rms that have closed down. 24 Our results using net pro…ts instead of OROA are similar.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
IV.B. Results, overall Table 3 presents the overall results, where we consider a window from …ve years before to …ve years after the founder death. 22 One might be tempted to exclude …rm-year observations after …rm closure, but that would introduce a bias.
23 Unlike returns to equity or returns to capital employed, OROA compares …rm pro…tability relative to total assets. In contrast to net income-based measures such as return on assets, OROA is not a¤ected by capital structure or dividend policy di¤erences across …rms. The asset base we use to compute yearly OROA is the average of assets at the beginning and the end of the calendar year. To avoid that outliers drive our results, we winsorize the yearly OROA values at the 5% level. 24 In an alternative speci…cation, we impute OROA equal to the average OROA in our data (about 6.1 percent).Under this alternative imputation, we obtain no e¤ects at the mean but very similar results for the 60-80 quantile regressions.
The magnitudes of the e¤ects are large; for example the mean employment e¤ects are about 17 percent, 25 while the mean e¤ects on sales is about 60 percent.
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IV.C. Sustained e¤ects?
While these results are consistent with a large and sustained causal e¤ect of entrepreneur death, there are simpler explanations. One explanation for our …ndings is that entrepreneur death creates turbulence and, perhaps, emotional turmoil. If turbulence drives our results, we would expect entrepreneur death to have a large short-run e¤ect on …rm performance, and a partial or full reversal over time. For example, …nding a substitute for the entrepreneur could be easier in the longer than in the shorter run. On the other hand, if the entrepreneur is a critical resource, we would expect the negative performance e¤ects to be long-lasting. To examine this question, we create interaction dummies to explore the timing of e¤ects of founder death. To examine whether the e¤ects we …nd on …rm performance are sustained, in the following table, we report results using one dummy for event time equal to {-5,-4,-3}, one dummy for event time equal to {-2,-1}, one dummy for event time equal to zero, and dummies for event time equal to {1,2} and {3,4,5}. Table 4 shows that compared to the control group, the performance for the treatment group of …rms deteriorates over time; we do not …nd evidence of a catch-up e¤ect by …rms that are exposed to entrepreneur death. In fact, our point estimates suggest that the immediate e¤ects of entrepreneur death are quite modest relative to the e¤ects that accumulate after some time. Thus entrepreneur death leads to large and sustained e¤ects.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
The interaction terms with pre-treatment dummies {-5,-4,-3} and {-2,-1} are giving further evidence that there are no pre-treatment e¤ects, i.e. founder death has no e¤ect on …rm performance in the years preceding death. This is an important "placebo"test supporting our identi…cation strategy. Note also that the …rm may go out of business before 25 Remember that with log dependent variables, coe¢ cients on dummy variables need to be transformed as exp(coe¢ cient) 1 to yield percentage e¤ects. 26 It is tempting to join these two results and say that labor productivity becomes much smaller after founder death. There are caveats with this. First some …rms have zero employees, so labor productivity is not de…ned. Second assets drop a lot too. Third that it could be the founder's direct productivity e¤ect rather than indirect e¤ect via the employees that we capture.
founder death, i.e. we do not condition on the …rm and the founder "staying together" until founder death. This is to avoid conditioning on an outcome variable.
The following …gure plots the estimated di¤erence between treated and control …rms across all years of event time, summarizing regression results in graphical form.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
The graphs illustrate that over time, the di¤erence between control and treated group is accentuated.
IV.D. Distributional e¤ects
The above results indicate that, on average, entrepreneurs have a large and sustained causal e¤ect on …rm performance. One possibility, consistent with the strong negative e¤ect on …rm survival, is that entrepreneur death speeds up evolution by weeding out weak …rms. We examine distributional e¤ects by performing quantile analysis. In particular we are interested in whether entrepreneur death has an e¤ect across the distribution of …rms, not only for weak …rms.
To address this issue, we look at quantile regressions for the same type of speci…cation as in Table 4 , i.e. comparing the performance of treated and control …rms at various quantiles of the performance distribution. Our evidence in Table 5 suggests that, at the lower half of the distribution, at the 25th percentile, there are no di¤erences between treated and control …rms whatsoever. The reason for this could be that the least wellperforming …rms do badly in any case, i.e. founder death has no e¤ect because control …rms in that part of the performance distribution are doing badly in any case. Note that the results at the lower end of the distribution are largely explained by the fact that both treated and control …rms at the lower quantiles of the distribution are going out of business.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
There are, however, e¤ects at the median and at the 75th and 90th percentile. There are negative e¤ects of founder death on log(assets) and log(sales) and -at the 75th and 90th percentile -on return on assets. At both quantiles, the e¤ects are stronger 3, 4 and 5 years after founder death. At the 95th percentile (not reported), di¤erences between treated and control …rms seem to disappear. This result has to be taken with caution because Chernozhukov and Fernandez-Val (2011) suggest that, for data sets of a sample size like ours, a normal distribution approximation at the 95th percentile might not be appropriate. But if the result at the 95th percentile turned out to be stable, it would indicate that the very best …rms are strong enough to do well without the founder.
IV.E. How do entrepreneur and …rm characteristics play a role?
So far, we have for the most part concentrated on homogeneous treatment e¤ects. One exception were the quantile regressions where we looked at di¤erences in the e¤ect of founder death over di¤erent parts of the outcome distribution. Now, we want to focus on whether certain types of entrepreneurs matter more or less, and in what type of …rms.
We approach these questions by introducing interaction terms between the treatment dummies and certain binary characteristics, e.g. whether the founder is highly educated or not. Likewise, we interact the before/after dummies and the di¤erence-in-di¤erences parameter 2 with binary indicators of founder or …rm characteristics. This informs us whether treatment a¤ects some …rms more than others, i.e. whether there is heterogeneity in treatment e¤ects.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
Motivated by a surge of interest in family …rms, we examine whether entrepreneur death a¤ects family and non-family …rms di¤erently. For example, we expected family …rms to be more resilient to the loss of the entrepreneur. We …nd, however, no di¤erence in results for family and non-family …rms. Although the estimated coe¢ cients are negative they are quite far from signi…cant. Both family …rms and non-family …rms seem to be equally a¤ected by death of a majority owner. Based on the endogenous growth literature (e.g., Glaeser et al., 1992) , we ask whether the causal e¤ect of individual entrepreneurs is lesser in urban areas, where the supply of entrepreneurs is denser. We …nd however, no di¤erence in causal e¤ect of entrepreneurs in rural and urban areas. 27 This might indicate that, even if there is a larger supply of (potential) entrepreneurs in a city, the 27 An interesting question is whether the causal e¤ect of entrepreneurs is smaller in urban areas with a higher entrepreneurship rate. This question is di¢ cult to answer because Norway has only a small number of cities, so we cannot exploit a lot of variation in entrepreneurship rates across cities. match between …rm and founder is so unique that the founder cannot easily be replaced by alternative entrepreneurs. Another dimension of interest is education of the founder.
Ideally we would like to have a measure of entrepreneurial ability. Some measure of IQ, although not necessarily capturing entrepreneurial ability might be of interest, but is only available for a very small subsample. But education as measured by schooling attainment is of interest in itself. We de…ne highly educated as having completed at least upper-secondary education, i.e. having at least 12 years of education. While we …nd additional negative e¤ects of founder death for highly educated founders for …rm survival, employment, sales and assets, they are statistically signi…cant only in the case of assets.
In unreported regressions, we …nd similar results for average education level in the sector the …rm is active in. The coe¢ cients on individual human capital and on sector human capital change only marginally if we include both as explanatory variables.
We also looked at whether founder death matters less for old founders (60 years or more in the startup year) because they might be less dynamic than younger founders and therefore potentially more easily replaceable. We do, however, not …nd di¤erences in treatment e¤ects by age (not reported). We also looked at the gender dimension, but …nd no heterogeneity of the treatment e¤ect in the gender dimension (not reported). Another concern is that many …rms in our sample could be vehicles for cutting the tax bill for essentially self-employed individuals, or …rms started up as a "consumption good" for the entrepreneur. 28 In both these cases one would not be surprised to see the …rm to vanish with the founder. We therefore investigated whether the e¤ect of entrepreneur death depends on startup size, the idea being that small startups are more likely to have founders with these types of motivations. We …nd only minor di¤erences in results for startups below and above median size in terms of initial equity. We then split …rms up depending on whether they had two or more employees at the end of the …rst year or not, or whether the entrepreneur was the sole owner at the incorporation date or not. Again the di¤erences are minor.
IV.F. Speci…cation checks
We want to highlight that some of our results presented above are also addressing the important issue whether indeed our …ndings of post-treatment e¤ects is causal in the sense that they are the result of an exogenously timed death. Similar to Jones (2005), we look at whether there are pre-treatment di¤erences between treated and control observations.
We have done so in the context of the regression estimates presented in Tables 4 and 5 and in the context of the graphs presented in Figure 1 . In all cases, there is no evidence of any pre-treatment di¤erences between treated and controls. The timing of founder death therefore seems to come as a surprise and we interpret di¤erences after founder death as the result of the (largely unexpected) founder death. We discussed already above that the …nding of no pre-treatment e¤ects is consistent with the alternative interpretation that even if the founder was ill before his death, on average that illness does not seem to have a¤ected …rm performance.
V. For how long in the …rm' s life do entrepreneurs matter?
We now examine whether the entrepreneur importance varies with …rm age. In order to examine this question we analyze whether the drop in …rm performance depends on …rm age when the entrepreneur dies. The …rm being older means that the entrepreneur has had more time to make an imprint. This led us to believe that the importance of the entrepreneur would initially be increasing. We …nd, however, that the importance of the entrepreneur diminishes with …rm age over a relatively large span of the …rm's early life.
We depict these results graphically be showing the treatment e¤ect as function of …rm age in the year when the founder dies. The plot is based on a third-order polynomial in …rm age, interacted with the treatment e¤ect. We depict the predicted e¤ect up to …rm age 8 years (recall that there are few …rms at …rm age larger than 8 years in our sample).
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
The …gure shows a very strong negative e¤ect of founder death for very young …rms.
We …nd a smaller but still signi…cant negative e¤ect for more mature …rms. Our results are particularly interesting against the background that the majority of new …rms do not survive for more than a few years. The fact that we …nd signi…cant e¤ects of founder death even after 8 years is thus informative for a very large number of …rms.
VI. Conclusion
Recent work suggest that there are large performance di¤erences between …rms of the same industry, region, and age. This paper considers one possible force -the entrepreneur -in explaining …rm performance. Exogenously timed entrepreneur deaths are used as a natural experiment to identify the causative impact of entrepreneurs. We …nd that …rms experience a sustained drop in growth, survival, and pro…tability across these death events, suggesting that entrepreneurs have a causative in ‡uence on economic outcomes of their …rms. The paper further shows that the e¤ects of the entrepreneurs are extremely strong for nascent …rms, but still strong after the …rms have come of some age. Our …ndings are particularly interesting against the background that the majority of startups do not survive for more than a few years. We have also shown that certain types of founders, notably those with higher formal training, are more important to their …rms.
These results add to the large literature on …rm, industry, regional, and institutional characteristics shaping economic outcomes.
The primary interest of this study is to improve our understanding of …rm performance.
However, the paper also informs a separate and very old literature on the nature of the …rm, stemming from Coase (1937) . Some theoretical views suggest that entrepreneurs, and human factors more generally, have little in ‡uence, while others see a clear role for the entrepreneur. Using exogenously timed entrepreneur deaths, the analysis in this paper presents a methodology for analyzing the causative impact of entrepreneurs. We reject the hypothesis that entrepreneurs do not matter. Entrepreneurs do matter and in a large and sustained way.
Why is the entrepreneur important? One thing that is suggested by our …ndings is that the entrepreneur increases the marginal value of other assets in the …rm. We …nd very large negative e¤ects on …rm assets after founder death. This is consistent with the view that the productivity of physical assets drops after the entrepreneur dies, and are allocated to more productive use elsewhere in the economy. We also …nd signi…cant negative e¤ects on the employment of the …rm, which suggests that the marginal product of labor decreases after the entrepreneur has vanished. Since the e¤ects are larger for sales than for employees, labor productivity, measured as sales divided by number of employees, drops by a large amount after entrepreneur death. Our data do not allow us to decompose this e¤ect into lower production, less units sold, or a lower product price; this is suggested for future research. In future work, we also wish to understand in more detail how …rms that lose the entrepreneur deal with the loss, through e.g., transfer of ownership.
Our results also relate to a current policy debate. The U.S. currently experiences a drop in startup activity (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2010) , which can be attributed to a drop in real estate values and more binding credit constraints. While it is well-known known that credit constraints can impede the creation of new …rms, much less known which frictions are important in creating these constraints. Our work suggests, consistent with the theoretical tradition based on Hart & Moore (1994) , that founder-speci…city could be an important mechanism behind credit constraints. Using the methodology developed in the paper, we plan to explore the relation between founder speci…city and credit constraints in future work. 
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